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REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY AND THE
NEW FAMILY: RECOGNIZING THE
OTHER MOTHER
Even if we can agree, therefore, that " family" and
"parenthood" are part of the good life, it is absurd to assume
that we can agree on the content of those terms and destructive
to pretend that we do.'
The old family is no more; the new family is not yet.2
Regardless of strong, negative feelings about lesbian couples raising
children in the United States,3 the number of lesbian couples raising chil-
dren is steadily increasing.4 These lesbian coparents often remain to-
gether in committed relationships with shared salaries, friends, and
values.5 However, while these women are assuming many, if not all, of
the responsibilities of parenthood, the law affords them few coordinate
1. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 141 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
2. Harry D. Krause, Family Law Reform v. "Family Values," Speech at the Brendan
F. Brown Lecture Series, Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law. (Oct.
15, 1992) adapted in Harry D. Krause, Family Law and Family Values, 9 J. CONTEMP.
HEALTH L. & POL'Y 109 (1993).
3. James D. Wilson, Gays Under Fire, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 14, 1992, at 35. A survey
revealed that 61% of Americans disapprove of adoption rights for gay spouses. Id. at 37.
This Comment does not argue in favor of or against the right of homosexual parents to
raise children. It merely proposes a solution to problems that often arise when a court
must determine the custody rights of a child produced in a lesbian coparent relationship.
This Comment focuses on female homosexual relationships rather than male homosexual
relationships because the arguments developed are based on judicial recognition of the
female's Constitutional right to procreate. See infra, notes 92-113 and accompanying text.
Likewise, many male homosexual couples are raising children. See generally Anne Press-
ley & Nancy Andrews, For Gay Couples, the Nursery Becomes the New Frontier, WASH.
PosT, Dec. 20, 1992, at Al.
4. Gina Kolata, Lesbian Partners Find The Means to be Partners, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30,
1989, at A13. By some estimates, 10,000 children are being raised by lesbian mothers who
conceived through artificial insemination. Alissa Friedman, The Necessity for State Recog-
nition of Same-Sex Marriage: Constitutional Requirements and Evolving Notions of Family,
3 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 134, 159 n.168 (1988) (citing E. Donald Shapiro & Lisa Schultz,
Single-Sex Families: The Impact of Birth Innovations Upon Traditional Family Notions, 24
J. FAM. L. 271, 278 (1985-86). Other estimates show that six to ten million children are
being raised in households with a homosexual parent. Id. A director of a sperm bank in
California stated that approximately 40% of the sperm bank's clients are lesbians couples
who intend to raise their children in a lesbian coparent family. Id.
5. Friedman, supra note 4, at 159. "The fact that some people think that 'practicing
homosexuality' is immoral does not lead lesbians and gay men to reject morality as a force
328 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 10:327
rights.6
These "families" are now a permanent fixture in society and "courts
must inevitably deal with the offspring of [lesbian coparents] ... and must
determine rights for support, visitation, inheritance, and all the other
traditional rights stemming from a heterosexual marriage."7 To do other-
wise will not serve the best interests of the children involved.
This Comment focuses on the problems faced by lesbian coparents,
courts, and society as a whole in the event of the couple's separation,8 or
the death or incapacity of the biological mother. This Comment proposes
an interim solution in contract, consistent with the best interests of the
child, in the event of the dissolution of the lesbian coparent relationship,
or the death or incapacity of the biological coparent. Part I of this Com-
ment provides a brief history of child custody law and discusses the con-
temporary status of child custody law in the United States. Part II
explores the current status of child custody law as it relates to lesbian
parents. In part III, this Comment describes new reproductive technol-
ogy and discusses the lesbian woman's constitutionally protected right to
use this technology for procreation. Part IV sets forth a contractual solu-
tion to the problems created when a lesbian couple separates, or when
the biological mother dies or becomes incapacitated. The Comment con-
cludes that courts should enforce these contracts absent a showing that
doing so would not be in the best interests of the child.
I. CURRENT STANDARDS'IN CHILD CUSTODY DETERMINATIONS
Child custody law involves rights and duties associated with the parent-
child relationship.9 Parental rights operate against the state, third parties,
and the child.1" Parents have the right to custody of the child, to disci-
in their lives. Nor does it discourage them from trying to instill values and morals in their
children." Id. at 159 n.168.
6. Id. at 136.
7. Id. at 160 (quoting E. Donald Shapiro & Lisa Schultz, Single-Sex Families: The
Impact of Birth Innovations Upon Traditional Family Notions, 24 J. FAM. L. 271,280 (1985-
1986)).
8. See generally Curiale v. Reagan, 272 Cal. Rptr. 520 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (holding
that the nonnatural lesbian coparent who jointly agreed to raise the child and support both
the biological mother and child for three years has no standing to assert a custody claim
after the couple's separation).
9. Mara Q. Berke, Note, In re Marriage of Birnbaum: Modifying Child Custody Ar-
rangements by Ignoring the Rules of the Game, 24 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 467, 469 (1991).
10. Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: The Need for
Legal Alternatives When the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70 VA. L. REV. 879,
884 (1984).
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pline the child, to make educational and medical decisions, to determine
religious upbringing, to name the child, to decide where the child lives, to
speak for the child by enforcing or waiving the child's rights, to determine
who may visit the child, and to place the child in another's care.'1 These
rights also confer upon the parent coordinate responsibilities, including
the duty to care for the child, provide financial support, educate the child,
provide medical care, and control the child.' 2
In a child custody dispute, the court decides with whom the child will
reside, who will have primary responsibility for the child's welfare, and
the permissible terms for visitation, if any.'3 Child custody law in the
United States presently focuses on the "best interests of the child."' 4 The
current focus evolved from the ancient Roman and early European con-
cept of patria potestas,"5 which vested in the father absolute authority
over the child,' 6 and the "tender years doctrine," which provided a ma-
ternal preference in child custody disputes.17
Courts make custody decisions based on the unique circumstances of
each case.' 8 While some states provide a statutory list of factors to aid
the court in determining what is in the best interests of the child,'9 two
11. Id. at 884-85.
12. Id. at 885,
13. Note, Custody Denials to Parents in Same Sex Relationships: An Equal Protection
Analysis, 102 HARV. L. REV. 617, 618 (1989) [hereinafter Equal Protection Analysis].
14. Andrea Charlow, Awarding Custody: The Best Interests of the Child and Other
Fictions, 5 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 267, 268 n.3 (1987). This doctrine, however, is not
universally hailed as the best solution for the child. See generally Id.
15. Id. at 267; see also Rebecca Korzec, A Tale of Two Religions: A Contractual Ap-
proach to Religion as a Factor in Child Custody and Visitation Disputes, 25 NEw ENG. L.
REV. 1121, 1123 (1991).
16. Korzec, supra note 15, at 1123. Under the concept of patria potestas, the child was
treated as chattel and the father had all rights in and to such "chattel." Charlow, supra
note 14, at 267 n.1.
17. See Allan Roth, The Tender Years Presumption in Child Custody Disputes, 15 J.
FAM. L. 423 (1976-77).
18. Charlow, supra note 14, at 268.
19. See, e.g., Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.270(1)(a)-(c) (Baldwin 1988); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 767.24(5)(a)-(k) (West 1993). The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act lists the
following relevant, but not exclusive, factors for custodial determinations:
(1) the wishes of the child's parent or parents as to his custody;
(2) the wishes of the child as to his custodian;
(3) the interaction and interrelationship of the child with his parent or parents,
his siblings, and any other person who may significantly affect the child's best
interest;
(4) the child's adjustment to his home, school, and community; and
(5) the mental and physical health of all individuals involved.
UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE Acr § 402, 9A U.L.A. 561 (1987).
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other states leave this determination to the sole discretion of the court.2"
In either event, courts ultimately exercise discretion in determining the
weight to be given each factor.21 The net result in either approach is a
judicial determination of "the best interests of the child."
There are three types of custody and visitation disputes, the classifica-
tion of which depends upon the parties involved. The first involves cus-
tody disputes between a child's natural parents.22 The second involves
disputes between a legally recognized parent and a nonlegally recognized
parent, or nonparent. 23 The third type of child custody dispute involves
contests which terminate parental rights.24
When a custody dispute involves a contest between a legally recognized
parent and nonparent, most courts follow the "parent's rights doctrine, "25
which permits granting custody to the nonparent only if the court is con-
vinced that the legal parent is unfit.26 A few jurisdictions impose a some-
what weaker burden wherein the nonlegally recognized parent must show
only that awarding custody to the natural parent would not be in the best
interests of the child.27 But regardless of which burden a given jurisdic-
tion employs, the nonlegally recognized parent often will be denied
standing to challenge parental custody.28
20. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-101(a) (1991).
21. Charlow, supra note 14, at 268.
22. See, e.g., Ashbee v. Cozart, No. 2910285, 1992 WL 336999, at *1 (Ala. Civ. App.
Nov. 20, 1992) (discussing a post divorce child custody battle between the natural parents).
In a child custody battle between the natural parents, the parents stand on equal footing
and the court uses the best interests of the child standard to determine custody. Nancy D.
Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to Meet the Needs of
Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontraditional Families, 78 GEO. L.J. 459, 471
(1990).
23. See, e.g., Nancy S. v. Michelle G., 279 Cal. Rptr. 212, 213-14 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
In this case, the natural mother sought a declaration that her lesbian partner, with whom
she had celebrated a "marriage" ceremony and agreed to raise a child, had no legal rights
with respect to that child. Id. at 214. This Comment focuses on the contest between the
legally recognized parent and the nonlegally recognized parent in the context of a lesbian
coparent relationship.
24. See, e.g., Roe v. Roe, 324 S.E.2d 691,694 (Va. 1985) (holding that the father was an
unfit custodian solely on the basis that his child was continuously exposed to his immoral
and illicit same sex relationship).
25. Note, Developments in the Law-Sexual Orientation and The Law, 102 HARV. L.
REV. 1508, 1634 (1989) [hereinafter Sexual Orientation].
26. Id.
27. Id.; See also Nancy S. v. Michele G., 279 Cal. Rptr. 212 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
28. Under the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, a nonbiological parent may insti-
tute a custody action only if the child is not in the physical custody of a biological parent.
UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORcE Acr §401(d)(2), 9A U.L.A. 550 (1987). This Comment
does not argue that any third party should have standing to challenge a biological parent's
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II. PRESENT LEGAL STATUS OF LESBIAN COPARENTS
When deciding which parent should be awarded custody of a child in a
custody dispute between the child's natural parents, courts have taken
one of three different approaches. 29 These variations shed light on judi-
cial attitudes towards lesbian coparenting. In some jurisdictions, the fact
that the biological or legal parent is involved in a relationship with some-
one of the same gender creates an irrebuttable presumption that granting
custody to that parent is not in the best interests of the child."0 In these
jurisdictions, lesbian coparents are unable to raise children lawfully.
Other jurisdictions have established a rebuttable presumption against
awarding custody to parents involved in such relationships. In these juris-
dictions the homosexual parent may overcome the presumption by show-
ing that the same sex relationship poses no harm to the child.3 In a third
group of jurisdictions consisting of at least ten states, courts have rejected
a presumption against awarding custody to parents solely on the basis of
their involvement in a same sex relationship.3 2
A court must recognize standing in the party seeking custody or visita-
custody rights. Rather, it argues that a party to a contract between lesbian coparents
should have standing to enforce that contract when enforcement is in best interests of the
child.
29. See Equal Protection Analysis, supra note 13, at 619.
30. Id. at 619 n.12 (citing G.A. v. D.A., 745 S.W.2d 726, 728 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987);
N.K.M. v. L.E.M., 606 S.W.2d 179, 186 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980); Roe v. Roe, 324 S.E.2d 691,
691 (Va. 1985)). These cases demonstrate that a judicially created irrebuttable presump-
tion against awarding custody to parents involved in same sex relationships exists in Mis-
souri and Virginia.
31. See Sexual Orientation, supra note 25, at 1631.
32. Id. at 1631 n.15 (citing S.N.E. v. R.L.B., 699 P.2d 875, 879 (Alaska 1985); In re
Marriage of Birdsall, 243 Cal. Rptr. 287, 289 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988); Nadler v. Superior
Court, 63 Cal. Rptr. 352, 354 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967); D.H. v. J.H., 418 N.E.2d 286, 293 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1981); Doe v. Doe, 452 N.E.2d 293,296 (Mass. App. Ct. 1983); In re J.S. & C., 324
A.2d 90, 92-94 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1974), affd, 362 A.2d 254 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1976); Stroman v. Williams, 353 S.E.2d 704, 705-06 (S.C. Ct. App. 1987); Medeiros v.
Medeiros, 8 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 2372 (Vt. Super. Ct. 1982); In re Marriage of Cabal-
quinto, 669 P.2d 886, 888 (Wash. 1983); Rowsey v. Rowsey, 329 S.E.2d 57, 60-61 (W. Va.
1985)). Courts rely on different theories to justify this more liberal treatment. The Massa-
chusetts court justified the lack of a per se rule by analogizing the homosexual relationship
of the mother to the illegal heterosexual relationship of the father which did not serve as a
bar to awarding the father custody of his minor child. Doe v. Doe, 452 N.E.2d at 296. The
New Jersey courts hold that a parent's right to custody of his or her child is protected by
the First, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments and cannot be subordinated without a show-
ing that the parent's activity impaired the health of the child. See, e.g., In re J.S. & C., 324
A.2d at 92-94. Thus, in New Jersey, a parent's homosexuality does not, per se, provide a
sufficient basis for disallowing custody. Id. at 94. The Washington courts hold that a par-
ent's homosexuality alone does not bar visitation rights because all the facts in the case
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tion. Nonbiological coparent status affords no greater standing than that
of any other third party seeking custody of a child in a contest with the
biological parent. The nonbiological coparent must offer prima facie evi-
dence for each of the statutory visitation factors that third parties must
present to obtain an evidentiary hearing,33 even though she may have
assisted in the insemination process, paid for the expenses associated with
the pregnancy, and supported both the biological mother and the child
since the birth.34 The practical result of the high burden imposed by the
parental preference doctrine is that the nonbiological coparent may be
cut off from the child at the whim of the biological coparent.35
Nonbiological coparents have sought custody rights by borrowing from
existing legal theories that have proven successful for heterosexual
couples. 36 These theories include adoption, in loco parentis,37 de facto
parenthood,38 and equitable parenthood.39 Although these legal doc-
trines provide some relief to the nonbiological coparent, they currently
do not adequately serve the best interests of the child or the nonbiologi-
cal mother.4 °
must be weighed to determine the best interests of the child. See, e.g., In re Marriage of
Cabalquinto, 669 P.2d at 888.
33. See, e.g., Kulla v. McNulty, 472 N.W.2d 175, 180-81 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991). The
Minnesota statute is illustrative:
A court shall grant the [visitation] petition if it finds that:
(1)visitation rights would be in the best interests of the child;
(2)the petitioner and child had established emotional ties creating a parent child
relationship; and
(3)visitation would not interfere with the relationship between the custodial par-
ent and the child.
MINN. STAT. § 257.022(2)(b) (1992).
34. Ann Hagerdorn & Amy D. Marcus, Case in California Could Expand Legal Defi-
nition of Parenthood, WALL ST. J., Sept. 8, 1989, at B10. Terri Sabol alleged these facts in
her custody suit against her former lover for custody of their child. Id.
35. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
36. See Polikoff, supra note 22, at 491.
37. "[In] [ljoco parentis exists when [a] person undertakes care and control of another
in absence of such supervision by latter's natural parents and in absence of formal legal
approval, and is temporary in character and is not to be likened to an adoption which is
permanent." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 787 (6th ed. 1990).
38. De Facto adoption is defined as, "[a]n agreement to adopt according to statutory
procedures in a given state which will ripen into de jure adoption when the petition is
properly presented." Id. at 416.
39. Equitable adoption "[r]efers to [the] situation involving oral contract to adopt
child, fully performed except that there was no statutory adoption, and in which rule is
applied for benefit of child in determination of heirship upon death of person contracting
to adopt." Id. at 538.
40. See Polikoff, supra note 22, at 500-02, 506-08.
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A. Same-Sex Adoption
Adoption is the "[legal process pursuant to state statute in which a
child's legal rights and duties toward his natural parents are terminated
and similar rights and duties toward his adoptive parents are substi-
tuted.",4 1 Adoption terminates the rights and coordinate responsibilities
of the natural parents and vests them in the adoptive parents.42 Adop-
tion is subject to judicial intervention and will only be permitted when it
is deemed to be in the best interests of the child.43 Because adoption is a
legislative creation, nonexistent at common law, courts must look to
adoption statutes to determine the propriety of an adoption petition.44
The language in most adoption statutes compels a majority of courts to
deny adoption petitions filed by same sex couples because the adoption
statute would divest the natural mother of her parental rights should the
court confer these rights on her lesbian partner.45 Adoption statutes,
drafted specifically for the nuclear family, permit only heterosexual
couples to obtain the rights and responsibilities of adopted parenthood.
The statutes only allow for one parent of each sex to be a legally recog-
nized parent, and thus do not permit two partners of the same sex to
share parental rights and responsibilities. While the statutes of only two
states explicitly forbid homosexual adoption,46 many courts deny adop-
tion by same sex couples on the basis that adoption by the nonbiological
coparent would terminate the biological coparent's rights and responsibil-
ities.47 Recently, however, the Surrogate's Court in New York County
broke from precedent and allowed a biological mother's lesbian partner
to adopt her six year old son.48 The court recognized and embraced the
41. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 49 (6th ed. 1990).
42. See Sexual Orientation, supra note 25, at 1642-43,
43. Id.
44. Emily C. Patt, Second Parent Adoption: When Crossing the Marital Barrier is in a
Child's Best Interests, 3 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 96, 112-13 (1988).
45. See Polikoff, supra note 22, at 522.
46. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.042(3) (West 1985); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 170-B:4
(1990). In an advisory opinion the New Hampshire Supreme Court held that § 170-B:4 of
the New Hampshire statute does not violate the Equal Protection clause or the Due Pro-
cess clause of either the New Hampshire or the United States Constitutions, and does not
infringe upon the right of freedom of association under either constitution. Opinion of the
Justices, 530 A.2d 21, 23-29 (N.H. 1987). The justices noted that the legislative purpose of
the statute was to protect children rather than to punish homosexual conduct, and that
homosexual conduct is not illegal in New Hampshire. Id. at 28.
47. See Patt, supra note 44, at 113.
48. In re Adoption of a Child Whose First Name is Evan, 583 N.Y.S.2d 997 (1992).
The court concluded that adoption was in the best interests of the child, noting that the
adoption would increase the boy's economic security, would not bringchange or trauma to
19941
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societal reality lesbian couples actually do raise children.49 This decision,
however, is inconsistent with precedent in a vast majority of states where
legislative amendments would likely be necessary to permit same sex
adoption. 0 Because adoption is largely unavailable to lesbian coparent
families, a contractual approach would bridge this legal gap until
lawmakers give their legislative blessings to same sex adoption.
B. In Loco Parentis
A person standing in loco parentis has assumed the position of a parent
by taking on the duties of a parent without a legal adoption.5" California
courts recognize this doctrine in the context of a stepparent-stepchild re-
lationship when the stepparent seeks custody of a nonadopted stepchild
upon dissolution of the marriage. 2 The intent of the party standing in
loco parentis largely determines the applicability of the doctrine: the
party has no legal obligation to seek custody of a nonadopted stepchild,
but is permitted to.5 3
Courts are reluctant to extend the doctrine to the nonbiological lesbian
coparent seeking custody after separation from her partner.54 Courts gen-
erally limit the use of the in loco parentis doctrine in two ways. First,
some courts deny the nonbiogical coparent standing in custody proceed-
ings.55 While a stepparent may have standing by virtue of the underlying
marital dissolution proceeding, the nonbiological coparent has no such
proceeding to exploit.56 Secondly, if the nonbiological coparent is able to
obtain standing, some courts have limited the effectiveness of the doc-
his life, and would enable him to participate in the nonbiological mother's employer pro-
vided health care plan. Id. at 998-99.
49. Id. at 1002.
50. See, e.g., In re Adoption of Charles B., 1988 WL 119937 (Ohio App.). But see In re
Adoption Petition of Nancy M., No. 89-5-0067-7 (Cal. Super. Ct. San Francisco County
Nov. 16, 1989) (permitting adoption by the nonbiological coparent without terminating the
parental rights of the biological parent); Adoptions of B.L.V.D. and E.L.V.D, 628 A.2d
1271 (Vt. 1993).
51. Elizabeth Delaney, Note, Statutory Protection of the Other Mother: Legally Recog-
nizing the Relationship Between the Nonbiological Lesbian Parent and Her Child, 43 HAS-
TINcs L.J. 177, 194 (1991).
52. Id.
53. See Polikoff, supra note 22, at 507.
54. See, e.g., Nancy S. v. Michelle G., 279 Cal. Rptr. 212 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
55. See, e.g., Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27, 29 (N.Y. 1991) (de facto parental
status does not afford the nonbiological coparent standing to seek custody of the child she
raised with the biological coparent).
56. See Delaney, supra note 51, at 195.
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trine for fear that it will undermine parental autonomy.57 Courts accom-
plish this by limiting the rights of a party standing in loco parentis to the
right to intervene on behalf of the child rather than the right to sue for
sole or joint custody." Furthermore, the party standing in loco parentis
will have to meet the higher "detriment" standard that all third parties
must meet in order to obtain custody over the biological coparent's objec-
tions. 9 For all of these reasons, the doctrine of in loco parentis does not
adequately serve the best interests of the children raised in lesbian
coparent families.
C. De .Facto Parenthood
A de facto parent is "[a] person who, on a day-to-day basis, assumes the
role of parent, seeking to fulfill both the child's physical needs and his
psychological need for affection and care."6 De facto parenthood en-
compasses a child-parent relationship that is defective in form, but ac-
cepted for all practical purposes;61 it exists in fact, but not at law.62
Parties who do not fit the legal definition of parent, but who nonetheless
consider themselves parents, often allege de facto parenthood in child
custody disputes. 63
De facto parenthood suffers from the same inadequacies that plague
the doctrine of in loco parentis. Without an underlying controversy, the
de facto parent often does not have standing to sue,6' and even if the
standing is granted, the most she can expect is limited visitation rights
because de facto parenthood does not afford joint custody.65 De facto
parenthood does not change the legal status of the party seeking custody:
57. See Nancy S., 279 Cal. Rptr. at 217.
58. E.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 109.119(1) (1989) (allowing any person "who has estab-
lished emotional ties creating a child-parent relationship with a child" to petition or inter-
vene on behalf of the child). The legislative intent is not to confer any parental rights upon
the de facto parent, but rather to "allow the courts to incorporate all relevant information
about the existence of such a relationship into the decision making process, thereby most
effectively serving the child's best interests." Delaney, supra note 51, at 200.
59. See P.L.H. v. E.C. & R.T., 601 So. 2d 1018 (Ala. Civ. App. 1992) (stating that a
nonparent who wishes custody must "present clear and convincing evidence that the [legal]
parent is unfit or unsuited for custody, and that the best interests of the child will be served
by granting custody to the nonparent, rather than the [legal] parent"). See also Delaney,
supra note 51, at 201.
60. Patt, supra note 44, at 107 (citing In re B.G., 523 P.2d 244, 253 n.18 (Cal. 1974)).
61. See Delaney, supra note 51, at 188.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 190.
65. Id. at 193.
1994]
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the petitioning party still faces the parental preference doctrine and must
satisfy the "detriment" standard applied to a third party seeking custody
of a child against the wishes of the legally recognized parent.66
D. Equitable Parenthood
The doctrine of equitable parenthood recognizes a husband who is not
the biological father of a child born to his wife during their marriage as
the natural father if: (1) the husband and child mutually acknowledge
such a relationship or if the mother has cooperated in the development of
a parent-child relationship between her child and husband, and (2) the
husband desires to have the rights of parenthood and accepts its coordi-
nate responsibilities. 67 The doctrine of equitable parenthood evolved
from the doctrine of equitable adoption, which allowed a child to inherit,
under the laws of intestate succession, from a man who was not his legal
father but who had recognized the child as his son.68 Courts extended
this doctrine to allow the "father" to sue for custody under the rationale
that if the "father" can be recognized as such after death there is no justi-
fication for not recognizing him as such while alive. 69 Under this doc-
trine, heterosexual couples have been able to extend the scope of
parenthood.
The potential strength of equitable parenthood is that it does not fore-
close the possibility of legally recognizing two parents of the same sex,70
and implies that parenthood can exist without a biological tie.71 While
this doctrine has yielded success for some married couples, nonbiological
lesbian coparents who have attempted to use equitable parenthood to
gain custody of the issue of their lesbian relationships have experienced
little success7 2 due to the legal preference for biological parents in cus-
66. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
67. Atkinson v. Atkinson, 408 N.W.2d 516, 519 (Mich. 1987). But see In re Marriage of
O'Brien, 772 P.2d 278, 283-84 (Kan. Ct. App. 1989) (denying custody because the Kansas
Supreme Court held that the state does not recognize the doctrine of equitable adoption).
See also Allan Stephens, Annotation, Parental Rights of Man who is Not Biological or
Adoptive Father of Child But was Husband or Cohabitant of Mother When Child Was Con-
ceived or Born, 84 A.L.R.4th 666 (1991).
68. See Stephens, supra note 67.
69. Id.
70. See Polikoff, supra note 22, at 500.
71. Id. at 501.
72. See Delaney, supra note 51, at 206. In California, which has adopted the Uniform
Parentage Act along with at least 26 other states, courts have held that the "equitable
parent," the de facto parent, and the parent standing in loco parentis do not have standing
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tody disputes.7 3
Thus, although the above theories serve the needs of the heterosexual
community, they currently do not yield satisfactory results for lesbian
coparents. The restrictive language of adoption statutes drafted for the
traditional nuclear family prohibit adoption by a nonbiological coparent.
Both de facto parenthood and in loco parentis fall short of meeting the
best interests of the child raised in a lesbian coparented family because
courts often deny standing to the nonbiological coparent, or limit the
nonbiological coparent's recovery to visitation rights if standing is
granted. Furthermore, courts have restricted equitable parenthood to
heterosexual couples. Judicial enforcement of contracts negotiated by
lesbian coparents, consistent with the best interests of the child, can fill
the void left by these traditional theories.
III. REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY
Advances in reproductive technology offer women feasible alternatives
to procreation within a heterosexual marriage.7 4 These advances, such as
artificial insemination,7 5 in vitro fertilization,7 6 and surrogate mother-
ing,77 offer expanded opportunities for women who, by choice, want to
have children outside the traditional rubric of the nuclear family.
7 8
on the ground that they do not meet the definition of parent under the Uniform Parentage
Act. Id. See, e.g., Nancy S. v. Michele G., 279 Cal. Rptr. 212, 216-18 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
73. Polikoff, supra note 22, at 501-02.
74. Note, Reproductive Technology and the Procreative Rights of the Unmarried, 98
HARV. L. REV. 669, 669 (1985) [hereinafter Reproductive Technology].
75. Artificial insemination involves the introduction of semen into the woman's uterus
or vagina by means other than coitus. See Sexual Orientation, supra note 25, at 1649 n.143.
This Comment discusses artificial insemination rather than other advances in reproductive
technology because artificial insemination supplies the missing element for pregnancy,
while in vitro fertilization and surrogate motherhood are methods to circumvent female
infertility.
76. In vitro fertilization, which is used by women who are unable to conceive because
of a fallopian dysfunction, involves implanting into the women's uterus an egg which has
been fertilized outside the women's body. Reproductive Technology, supra note 74, at 669
n.2.
77. Surrogacy involves the artificial insemination of a woman who contractually agrees
to relinquish her parental rights in that child to the father or the father and his wife. Id. at
669 n.4. This Comment does not discuss surrogacy in light of its tenuous status after Matter
of Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988) (holding that surrogacy contracts are unenforceable
as against public policy).
78. Reproductive Technology, supra note 74, at 669; Sheila M. O'Rourke, Family Law
in a Brave New World: Private Ordering of Parental Rights and Responsibilities for Donor
Insemination, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 140, 141 (1985). Single women do not represent
the only segment of society taking advantage of reproductive technology. In 1987, the
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Lesbian couples who wish to raise a child together most often do so by
artificially inseminating one of the partners. The woman may obtain
sperm from a physician, a sperm bank or a private donor.79 The method
chosen is significant because it largely determines the legal rights and ob-
ligations of the parties involved with respect to the resulting child.8"
The advantage of obtaining sperm either from a sperm bank or under
the supervision of a physician is that the donor's identity is not disclosed
to recipients, and the recipient's identity is not disclosed to the donor."1
The preservation of anonymity drastically reduces the possibility of a pa-
ternity suit.82 In fact, at least seven states provide that a donor's rights
and responsibilities are severed when the procedure is done under a doc-
tor's supervision or through a sperm bank. 3 TWo of these states termi-
nate the donor's paternity rights and obligations unless the parties agree
otherwise.8' This presumption applies both when a licensed physician su-
pervises the process, as well as when the parties employ a private donor.8 5
In states with statutes that allow the donor and recipient to contract out
the donor's parental rights, an unmarried, artificially inseminated mother
has the choice to raise the child on her own, in conjunction with the do-
nor (if he consents), or with a partner other than the donor.86 However,
in jurisdictions that have adopted the Uniform Parentage Act, the do-
Washington Post reported that an unmarried priest utilized the procedure to conceive a
child. Marjorie Hyer, A Need Examined, a Prayer Fulfilled: Unmarried Priest Bears Child
by Artificial Insemination, WASH. POST, Dec. 7, 1987, at Al.
79. O'Rourke, supra note 78, at 143.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. However, not all authorities agree that anonymity protects the best interests of
the child. Ann T. Lamport, Note, The Genetics of Secrecy in Adoption, Artificial Insemiia-
tion, and In Vitro Fertilization, 14 AM. J.L. & MED. 109, 116-17 (1988) (arguing that ano-
nymity can lead to half-sibling matings and other genetic difficulties). The problem of
genetic screening is beyond the scope of this Comment.
83. CAL. CIV. CODE § 7005(b) (West 1983); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-4-106(2) (Supp.
1992); N.J. REV. STAT. § 9:17-44 (Supp. 1988); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.050(2) (1985);
WYO. STAT. § 14-2-103(b) (1986). "[P]hysicians have guarded the public's purse, its com-
mon morality, and its social structure by acting as gatekeepers, refusing to inseminate can-
didates whom they have felt unfit to the task." Daniel Wikler & Norma J. Wikler, Turkey-
baster Babies: The Demedicalization of Artificial Insemination, 69 MILBANK Q. 5, 13
(1991). Predicating the legal status of the donor on the presence of a physician gives the
medical profession unjustifiable control over who may be immunized from paternity claims
in the use of reproductive technology. See Sexual Orientation, supra note 25, at 1653 n.167.
"Medical gatekeeping" has caused many women to rely on self-insemination rather than
physician assisted insemination. Wikler & Wikler supra at 6.
84. OR. REV. STAT. § 109.239 (1987); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 12.03(b) (West 1986).
85. See O'Rourke, supra note 78, at 147.
86. Id.
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nor's paternity rights and obligations are severed only when the woman is
married and is inseminated under the supervision of a physician. 7 Re-
stricting the right to sever the donor's rights and responsibilities to mar-
ried couples may unconstitutionally hinder a single woman's right to
procreate.88
Physician supervision, however, is not necessary for successful artificial
insemination. Some women obtain donor semen from a private source,
either directly or through a third party.89 While this approach allows the
woman the greatest degree of control, it also allows, both as a practical
and a legal matter, both the donor and biological mother to assert rights
and enforce responsibilities which could lead to custody disputes between
the parties.' In at least two states, however, parties involved in artificial
insemination may contract out of parental rights and obligations regard-
less of whether the sperm is obtained from a direct private source, a
sperm bank, or under the supervision of a physician.91 Allowing the par-
ties to contract out the donor's paternity rights provides the basis for the
contractual solution proposed in this Comment.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO PROCREATE WITH THE AID OF
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY
The theory that the Constitution of the United States protects a wo-
man's procreative rights, including the right to procreate with the aid of
reproductive technology has been proposed in a Harvard Law Review
Note. 92 The Note finds support for this theory in the United States
87. UNIF. PARENTAGE AcT § 5, 9B U.L.A. 301-02 (1989). Section five of the Act
provides:
(a)If, under the supervision of a licensed physician and with the consent of her
husband, a wife is inseminated artificially with semen donated by a man not her
husband, the husband is treated in law as if he were the natural father of a child
thereby conceived...
(b)The donor of semen provided to a licensed physician for use in artificial
insemination of a married woman other than the donor's wife is treated in law as
if he were not the natural father of a child thereby conceived.
Id.
88. See infra notes 107-11 and accompanying text.
89. It is not unusual for a lesbian couple to obtain sperm from a relative of the nonin-
seminated partner in order to pass on the family genes of both partners. ANNETTE BARAN
& RUEBEN PANNOR, LETHAL SECRETS, THE SHOCKING CONSEQUENCES AND UNSOLVED
PROBLEMS OF ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION; PARENTS, CHILDREN, DONORS, AND EXPERTS
SPEAK OUT 132 (1990).
90. See O'Rourke, supra note 78, at 143.
91. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
92. See Reproductive Technology, supra note 74, at 674-75.
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Supreme Court's holdings in three areas related to procreation: steriliza-
tion, contraception, and abortion.93
The United States Supreme Court addressed the question of state-man-
dated sterilization in two cases. Writing for the Court in 1927, Justice
Holmes concluded in Buck v. Bell94 that the sterilization of an imbecile
without consent was neither violative of due process or equal protec-
tion.95 While never expressly overruled, Buck "is now widely regarded as
an aberration, largely the product of a misguided, pseudoscientific eugen-
ics fad."96 The second case, Skinner v. Oklahoma' "commands greater
respect."9 In Skinner, the Court applied strict scrutiny to an equal pro-
tection challenge seeking to invalidate a criminal statute that ordered
sterilization as punishment for repeated felony convictions, but that ex-
empted certain white collar crimes such as embezzlement. 9 Skinner sup-
ports the individual's right to procreate outside of marriage by
emphasizing the importance of procreation to the individual and soci-
ety:" ° "[the right to have offspring is] a sensitive and important area of
human rights ... a right which is basic to the perpetuation of a race."'1 '
The Note argues that the "basic liberty" at stake in Skinner is tied to
procreation itself, to the ability to bear children, and therefore is not de-
pendent upon the individual's marital status. °2
The Note also finds support for a single woman's right to procreate in
cases involving contraception. Despite the Supreme Court's initial hold-
ing in Griswold v. Connecticut'03 that a state's ban on contraception vio-
lates the right of marital privacy,"° the Court later extended the right to
avoid pregnancy by the use of contraceptives beyond the marital context
93. Id. at 675. "Although the cases address specific aspects of the procreation process,
they can best be explained as stages in the elaboration of a more general right that guaran-
tees the individual a substantial measure of control over all aspects of procreation." Id.
94. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
95. Id. at 207.
96. Reproductive Technology, supra note 74, at 675 (citing Cynkar, Buck v. Bell: "Felt
Necessities" v. Fundamental Values?, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1418 (1981)). "Most scholars
agree that the case [Buck v. Bell] would be overturned if presented to the Supreme Court
today." Id. at 675 n.37 (citations omitted).
97. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
98. Reproductive Technology, supra note 74, at 675.
99. Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541.
100. See Reproductive Technology, supra note 74, at 675.
101. Id. at 676 (quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 536 (1942)).
102. Id.
103. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
104. Id. at 485-86.
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in Eisenstadt v. Baird.105 Eisenstadt supports the proposition that an indi-
vidual's right to control decisions about procreation flows from the indi-
vidual's interest in autonomy, regardless of the individual's marital
status.10 6 The premise that a single woman has a fundamental right to
control her procreative system to prevent pregnancy supports the conclu-
sion that a single woman has a fundamental rightto control her reproduc-
tive system to conceive with the aid of reproductive technology.
The Supreme Court's decisions concerning abortion further support a
single woman's right to procreate with the aid of reproductive technol-
ogy.107 For example, in Roe v. Wade'"8 the Court emphasizes the rela-
tionship between procreation and the right of privacy." °  When
examined together, these cases support the proposition that an individ-
ual's decisions concerning procreation are protected by a Constitutional
right to privacy.'10 If this proposition is accepted by the Court, the state
will be required to present a compelling interest to justify restricting a
single woman's access to new reproductive technology."'
Once the single woman's constitutional right to procreate with the aid
of reproductive technology is established, donors and donees must be al-
lowed to contract out of parental rights and responsibilities. If states do
not permit the donors to "opt out" of their parental rights and responsi-
bilities, the states are effectively limiting the number of potential donors
by exposing them to liability for support." 2 Thus, the inability of donors
to "opt out" could deny the single woman her constitutionally protected
105. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (plurality opinion). The Eisenstadt
court stated:
It is true that in Griswold the right of privacy ... inhered in the marital rela-
tionship. Yet the marital couple is not an independent entity with a mind and
heart of its own, but an association of two individuals each with a separate intel-
lectual and emotional makeup. If the right of privacy means anything, it is the
right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted govern-
mental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision
whether to bear or beget a child.
Id.
106. Id.; see also Reproductive Technology, supra note 74, at 676-77.
107. See Reproductive Technology, supra note 74, at 677.
108. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
109. Id. at 152-54. While the validity of Roe is uncertain in light of Planned Parenthood
v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992), the Supreme Court continues to recognize an individual's
right to procreate. The right to procreate does not rest on the constitutionality of Roe
because this right does not threaten the separate interest in the preservation of life. Repro-
ductive Technology, supra note 74, at 677 n.50.
110. See Reproductive Technology, supra note 74, at 677.
111. Id.
112. See O'Rourke. supra note 78, at 151.
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right to procreate with the aid of artificial insemination. 13 Furthermore,
the ability to "opt out" allows the biological coparent to retain all the
parental rights and responsibilities in herself which would facilitate trans-
ferring some of those rights and responsibilities to the nonbiological
coparent through the contract proposed in this Comment.
V. SOLUTION IN CONTRACT
Because the doctrines of de facto parenthood," 4 in loco parentis," 5
and equitable parenthood" 16 do not adequately meet the needs of lesbian
coparents, and because same sex adoption" 7 has not yet been widely ac-
cepted, an interim solution is needed to protect the best interests of the
children raised by lesbian coparents. "[U]nlike married partners whose
obligations are specified by law, unmarried partners must create and de-
lineate their mutual obligations in accordance with the needs of their
relationship."' "18
The law of contracts offers a solution for children raised in lesbian
coparent relationships that is consistent with the best interests of those
children. The courts could enforce contracts wherein the parties set forth
their parental rights and obligations. This solution requires two contrac-
tual steps to further the best interests of the child being raised by lesbian
coparents. The first step severs the rights and responsibilities of the bio-
logical father; the second provides the nonbiological coparent with paren-
tal rights in the event of separation of the couple, or the death or
incapacity of the biological coparent.
Recent trends in family law indicate increasing legal acceptance of
such contractual provisions.1 19 The rise of "no fault" divorce indicates
that states have relinquished some control over the marriage contract.' 20
Prenuptial and postnuptial agreements also offer married partners
greater autonomy at the expense of state control by allowing them to
downgrade the marital contract to which the state is a party.' 2' By al-
lowing marital partners greater autonomy in structure and control of
their marriage, the state has allowed for greater legal acceptance of non-
113. Id.
114. See supra notes 60-66 and accompanying text.
115. See supra notes 51-59 and accompanying text.
116. See supra notes 67-73 and accompanying text.
117. See supra notes 41-50 and accompanying text.
118. See Sexual Orientation, supra note 25, at 1625.
119. Id. at 1624-25.
120. See O'Rourke, supra note 78, at 162.
121. See Krause, supra note 2.
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traditional families.122
Courts have also begun to give increased weight in custody and divorce
proceedings to agreements resulting from negotiations between the natu-
ral parents.' 23 Some courts have held that a custody agreement between
the parents is a significant factor in child custody determinations. 24
Other courts have held that custody agreements between husband and
wife will be upheld as long as they are in the best interests of the child.125
Most noteworthy is a New MeXico Court of Appeals decision that cus-
tody agreements between a lesbian parent and her partner were not per
se unenforceable. 26 Such increasing judicial tolerance for personal au-
tonomy in child custody agreements provides fertile ground for a solution
in contract.
A. Severing the Paternal Rights and Responsibilities
The first step in this contractual solution requires divesting the natural
father of his rights and obligations toward the child. This step makes the
biological mother the only legal parent, because when one parent ceases
to be a parent for any reason, the other parent ipso facto assumes all
parental rights and responsibilities. 127 There are several methods of ter-
minating a natural father's parental rights and responsibilities. Most ob-
viously, the death of the natural father terminates his parental rights.
Neglect or dependency proceedings may result in a permanent termina-
tion of parental rights.128 Adoption also terminates the rights of natural
122. Id.
123. See infra notes 127-29 and accompanying text. But see In re Marriage of Mager,
785 P.2d 198, 200 (Mont. 1990) (holding that parties may not make binding contracts re-
garding support, custody, or visitation, and the trial court must determine the best interests
of the child using the factors prescribed by statute).
124. See, e.g., Ruffin v. Ruffin, 560 N.Y.S.2d 885, 886 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990).
125. See, e.g., Crocker v. Crocker, 195 F.2d 236, 237 (10th Cir. 1952). But see Ford v.
Ford, 371 U.S. 187, 193 (1962) (holding that under Virginia law, parents cannot make an
agreement that will bind a court to decide a custody case in a predetermined manner); In
re Marriage of Mager, 785 P.2d 198, 200 (Mont. 1990) (holding that parties may not make a
binding agreement as to custody or visitation because such agreements would not necessar-
ily be in the best interests of the child); Hill v. Moorman, 525 So. 2d 681, 681 (La. Ct. App.
1988) (holding that a contract between natural parents and adoptive parents that permits
the natural parent to visit the adopted child is unenforceable as against public policy).
126. A.C. v. C.B., 829 P.2d 660, 661-64 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that a child cus-
tody agreement between the nonbiological lesbian coparent and the biological lesbian
coparent is not unenforceable per se, and that the petitioner's sexual orientation alone is
not a permissible basis for denying custody or visitation).
127. See Bartlett, supra note 10, at 883.
128. See Sexual Orientation, supra note 25, at 1635.
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parents.
129
Although these methods will sever the rights and obligations of the
father, conception through artificial insemination may provide the best
method for lesbian coparents. In fact, several state statutes terminate the
donor's rights and obligations to the child conceived therefrom when the
parties use a sperm bank or operate under the supervision of a physi-
cian.130 Furthermore, at least two states presume that the donor is not
the legal father unless the parties contract otherwise, regardless of
whether the parties employ a sperm bank or proceed under the supervi-
sion of a physician.' 3 ' Through the use of artificial insemination a single
woman can give birth to a child for whom she is the only legal parent.
Thus, denying a single woman the ability to sever the rights and obliga-
tions of the donor may violate her constitutional right to procreate.' 32
One author has suggested that arrangements where women and donors
contract out the donor's parental rights and obligations, may violate anti-
baby selling statutes.' 33 While this argument may have some validity in
the context of adoption and surrogacy, the same cannot be said for artifi-
cial insemination, because the "commodity" is semen rather than live ba-
bies.' 34 Semen is not a constitutionally protected entity, whereas a fetus
and the mother's relationship with that fetus during gestation are consti-
tutionally protected.' 35 "The level of legal and public policy concerns
over the exchange of semen do not reach the same heights as the concern
over the welfare of live babies.' 36 Thus, the law should not hinder pro-
spective lesbian coparents from severing the parental rights and responsi-
bilities of the donor when doing so would be in the best interests of the
child.
B. The Contract Between the Coparents
Once the father's rights and obligations are extinguished, the parental
rights would vest solely in the biological mother. 37 When the lesbian
partners determine that they want to raise a child together they must de-
129. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
130. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
131. OR. REV. STAT. § 109.239 (1987); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 12.03(b) (West 1986).
132. See supra notes 92-113 and accompanying text (arguing a single woman has a con-
stitutional right to use reproductive technology).
133. See O'Rourke, supra note 78, at 159.
134. Id.
135. Id. (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)).
136. Id. at 159.
137. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
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termine the rights and obligations of each coparent and put this into a
written contract so that courts will enforce it if the couple separates, or if
the biological coparent dies or is incapacitated.
In the contract, the parties may wish to establish financial obligations
to require the nonbiological mother to partially or fully support the child.
The parties could agree upon custody and visitation rights should the
couple separate in the future. The contract could include numerous other
provisions, such as a stipulation of the child's surname, the faith under
which the child would be raised, or any other parental right or duty that
the parties wish to stipulate. 3 '
Courts could enforce such a pre-separation, pre-death contract in a
post hoc situation. Judicial inquiry would focus on whether the coparents
had entered into an express contract regarding the rights and responsibili-
ties of the nonbiological coparent. If such an agreement exists, the court
would enforce the contract absent a clear showing that enforcement
would not be in the best interests of the child.
Because the nonbiological mother would assume the duties of
parenthood in exchange for the coordinate rights, there would be no lack
of consideration to void the contract. Although courts may be disinclined
to enforce these contracts on the grounds that they would not serve the
best interests of the child, enforcement would be appropriate absent an
affirmative showing that the contract is not in the best interest of the
child.
It is important to note that a biological link is not necessary for an
individual to be a good parent; the biological parent, an adoptive parent,
or any other caring adult can properly fulfill the role of parent.139 In the
context of a lesbian coparent relationship, the nonbiological coparent in
fact becomes a psychological parent upon whom the children depend for
love and support."4 As the law now stands, in the family unit where the
child is being raised by a legal parent and a nonlegally recognized parent
there is no legal protection of the nonlegally recognized coparent.' 4 1
Continuity and consistency are fundamental requirements for a child's
138. See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text (discussing the parental rights and
responsibilities to which the parties may stipulate).
139. See Patt, supra note 44, at 103 (quoting JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET. AL., BEYOND THE
BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 19 (2d ed. 1979)).
140. Elizabeth Zuckerman, Second Parent Adoption for Lesbian-Parented Families:
Legal Recognition of the Other Mother, 19 U. C. DAVIS L. REV. 729, 741 (1986).
141. See Patt, supra note 44, at 105.
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healthy development. 142 An enforceable contract would be in the best
interests of the child because by creating legal recognition of the nonbio-
logical coparent, the contract would increase the likelihood of continuity
in the relationship between the child and nonbiological parent should the
couple separate. The increased stability and certainty of an enforceable
contract would benefit both the children and the parents.
The same need for continuity exists when the biological mother dies:
"maintenance of a continuous relationship between a child and a stable,
familiar, adult figure is crucial in the event of the death or incapacity of a
child's legal parent.' 43 Judicial enforcement of a contract could facilitate
adoption of the child by the nonbiological coparent in the event of death
or permanent incapacity of the biological coparent because the nonbio-
logical coparent would be legally recognized. 44 Once again the contract
would serve the best interests of the child by providing stability and con-
sistency in the child's life.
Finally, the legally enforceable contract would permit two willing par-
ents to assume the responsibilities of parenthood. In addition to love and
affection and other intangible benefits which parents confer on their chil-
dren, these two parents would be able to provide future financial support
and inheritance. Both the child and the state would be able to enforce
the contractual duty to provide financial support in the same manner that
a child or mother could in the case of a deadbeat father. Unarguably, this
would be in the best interests of the child.
V. CONCLUSION
Lesbian women are coming together as families and raising children
with two mothers. The United States Constitution guarantees these wo-
men the right to procreate and raise a family outside the bounds of mar-
riage. Because present law is not equipped to handle these post nuclear
families, an interim solution is needed. Enforcement of contracts between
lesbian coparents, consistent with the best interests of the child, would
provide such an interim solution. Enforceable contracts would provide
economic and emotional stability in the life of the child of the lesbian
142. Id. at 102.
143. Id. at 106. Patt argues in favor of same sex adoption, a step that courts and legisla-
tures largely have been unwilling to accept. The solution in contract offers many of the
benefits of adoption including financial and emotional stability.
144. In the event of the death of the biological mother, adoption would be possible
because the statutory provisions which sever the rights of the natural parents no longer
would be of concern. See supra notes 41-50 and accompanying text.
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coparent relationship. This stability would serve the best interests of the
child in the event of the couple's separation, or the death or incapacity of
the biological mother. When a person is willing to provide love, atten-
tion, and financial support to a child who is the product of her relation-
ship, there is no reason why the law should stand in her way.
John E. Durkin

